what were the costs to the civil war

The Economic history of the U.s.a. Ceremonious War concerns the financing of the Union and Amalgamated war efforts in 1861–1865, and the economic impact of the state of war.

The Union economy grew and prospered during the war while fielding a very large army and navy.[one] The Republicans in Washington had a Whiggish vision of an industrial nation, with nifty cities, efficient factories, productive farms, all national banks, all knit together by a mod railroad organization, to exist mobilized by the United states Military Railroad. The Southward had resisted policies such as tariffs to promote manufacture and homestead laws to promote farming because slavery would not benefit. With the Southward gone and Northern Democrats weak, the Republicans enacted their legislation. At the same fourth dimension they passed new taxes to pay for part of the war and issued large amounts of bonds to pay for most of the rest. Economic historians attribute the residuum of the cost of the war to inflation. According to Matthew Gallman, In terms of total state of war spending the The states federal regime spent $1.viii billion and united states $0.five billion. This does not count long-term costs after the war concluded such equally veterans' benefits. The Confederate federal and state governments spent the equivalent of $ane.0 billion in Usa dollars. The The states obtained 21% of the state of war funding from revenue enhancement, 66% from borrowing, and 13% from inflation. Past contrast the Confederacy obtained only v% from taxation, 35% from borrowing, and 60% from aggrandizement.[2]

In Washington Congress wrote an elaborate program of economic modernization that had the dual purpose of winning the state of war and permanently transforming the economic system.[3]

The wartime devastation of the S was great and poverty ensued; incomes of whites dropped, just income of the former slaves rose. During Reconstruction railroad construction was heavily subsidized (with much abuse), but the region maintained its dependence on cotton. Quondam slaves became wage laborers, tenant farmers, or sharecroppers. They were joined by many poor whites, every bit the population grew faster than the economy. As late as 1940 the only significant manufacturing industries were textile mills (generally in the upland Carolinas) and some steel in Alabama.[four] [5]

The industrial advantages of the North over the South helped secure a Northern victory in the American Civil War (1861–1865). The Northern victory sealed the destiny of the nation and its economical organisation. The slave-labor system was abolished; sharecropping emerged and replaced slavery to supply the labor needed for cotton production, but cotton prices plunged during the Depression of 1873, leading Southern plantations to turn down in profitability. Northern manufacture, which had expanded rapidly before and during the war, surged ahead. Industrialists came to dominate many aspects of the nation'due south life, including social and political affairs.[six]

Spousal relationship policy [edit]

Later the war began in April 1861, President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase faced the massive challenge of funding it. In Congress Senator William P. Fessenden and Congressman Thaddeus Stevens took the atomic number 82.[7] Congress quickly approved Lincoln'south request to assemble a 500,000-man regular army, but initially resisted raising taxes to pay for the war. However, afterwards the Wedlock defeat at the First Battle of Bull Run in July, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1861, which imposed the get-go federal income tax in U.Southward. history. The deed created a flat tax of three percent on incomes above $800 ($23,000 in electric current dollar terms). This tax of income reflected the increasing amount of wealth held in stocks and bonds rather than property, which the federal government had taxed in the past.[8] Every bit the average urban worker made $600 per year, the income revenue enhancement burden fell primarily on the rich.[9]

High protective tariff [edit]

Congress passed the second and tertiary Morrill Tariffs, the first having get constabulary in the last months of Buchanan's tenure. These tariff acts raised import duties considerably compared, and they were designed to both raise acquirement and protect domestic manufacturing against foreign competition. During the war, the tariff likewise helped manufacturers off-set the burden of new taxes. Compared to pre-war levels, the tariff would remain relatively high for the remainder of the 19th century.[10] Throughout the war, members of Congress would debate whether to enhance further revenue primarily through increased tariff rates, which most strongly affected rural areas in the Westward, or increased income taxes, which nearly strongly afflicted wealthier individuals in the Northeast.[11]

Greenbacks [edit]

The revenue measures of 1861 proved inadequate for the funding of the state of war, forcing Congress to pass farther bills designed to generate revenue.[12] In February 1862, Congress passed the Legal Tender Human action, which authorized the minting of $150 meg of "greenbacks." The fence was tearing equally "paper money" seemed a route to excessive inflation and had no prewar back up. Simply the Army needed to pay its suppliers and soldiers without delay. Greenbacks were the first banknotes issued by the federal government since the end of the American Revolution, when the [Early American currency#Continental currency|"Continentals"]] caused runaway aggrandizement and became almost worthless. The new Greenbacks were non backed by specie (golden or argent), only rather by the requirement that merchants honor their face value for purchases and debts. By the end of the war, $450 million worth of greenbacks were in circulation. [13] They were highly effective and (after borrowing) were the major solution the Treasury needed to finance the war[xiv] [15]

Taxes [edit]

Ax military expenses soared, the Marriage armies faltered in their plan to capture Richmond. Pessimism grew in financial circles. The Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1862, which established a new excise taxation that affected nearly every commodity,[16] The new revenue enhancement was similar to the sales taxation imposed by state governments in the 20th century. According to one newspaper account it fix a federal tax on: [17] Liquor, beer, tobacco, cigars, lard, linseed oil, paper, soap, salt, shoe leather, flour, railroad passengers (per mile), steamboat passengers, ferry boats, trolleys, advertisements, and carriages. The new police as well imposed the get-go income revenue enhancement, starting at 3% on incomes over $600 a year and five% on incomes over $10,000.[18] Dozens of lobbyists fought back, warning that even a small 5% tax would bankrupt minor concern; Congress pushed alee because the war crisis was urgent.[19] The new law besides imposed the first national inheritance tax.[20] To collect these taxes, Congress created the Office of the Commissioner of Internal Acquirement within the Treasury Department. Starting with three clerks it rapidly expanded to 4000 clerks and field agents in 185 districts.[20] [21] Lincoln signed the Revenue Human action on July 1, 1862, ansd two weeks afterwards signed the new tariff law, that raised rates to 37%. Britain was the largest trading partner, and its protests were ignored past Americans annoyed that it had created and funding a systen of blockade runners to supply the S with food and munitions.[22]

Despite these new measures, funding the war connected to exist a hard struggle for Chase and the Lincoln administration.[23] The authorities continued to issue greenbacks and borrow large amounts of money, and the The states national debt grew from $65 1000000 in 1860 to $2 billion in 1866.[14] Congress passed the Revenue Human activity of 1864, which represented a compromise between those who favored a more progressive tax construction and those who favored a flat tax.[24] The act established a five percent tax on incomes greater than $600, a x percent tax on incomes above $10,000, and raised taxes on businesses.[20] In early 1865, Congress passed another tax increment, levying a tax of ten per centum on incomes above $5000. Past 1865, the income revenue enhancement constituted about one-5th of the revenue of the federal government.[20] The federal inheritance revenue enhancement would remain in effect until its repeal in 1870, while the federal income tax was repealed in 1872.[25]

Hoping to stabilize the currency, Chase convinced Congress to pass the National Banking Act in Feb 1863, as well as a second cyberbanking act in 1864. Those acts established the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to oversee "national banks," which would be subject to federal, rather than land, regulation. In return for investing a 3rd of their capital in federal bonds, these national banks were authorized to consequence federal banknotes.[23] After Congress imposed a revenue enhancement on individual banknotes in March 1865, federal banknotes would become the dominant form of paper currency in the United States.[nine]

Borrowing [edit]

Both sides tried to borrow; the Union did a much better job, primarily considering the new national cyberbanking system had monetized the North'due south wealth. Philadelphia banker Jay Cooke democratized financing. He organized highly publicized campaigns that enabled ordinary middle class citizens to buy $50 savings bonds in monthly installments. Sales reached $ane.2 billion and paid for 40% of the federal war budget.[26] The purchasers of bonds gave up money that would have been spent on civilian appurtenances, in return for the promise that they would be repaid with interest after the war. They were; the bonds were eventually paid off by taxpayers who were children in 1860, and who by 1890 were much wealthier than their parents. Taxes likewise diverted spending from the civilian into the military sector, but the burden savage entirely upon the wartime taxpayer. Probably half the savings of the Due north went into the state of war attempt, but there was much left over to invest in new factories, railroads, and enterprises. The private sector flourished in the North, and shrivelled away in the South. In Philadelphia, one new factory opened every calendar week; in the South, one airtight every week.[27] [28]

In terms of selling bonds in Europe, the Union had little luck. The main British and French banks, including the Rothschilds, wqere highly reluctant. Furthermore the Trent Affair of late 1861 angered the London bankers who saw the take a chance of war between Britain and the United states of america. Withal the Barings Bank did fund U.Due south. arms purchases.[29] [30]

Amalgamated policy [edit]

The Amalgamated States of America (1861-1865) started with an agrarian-based economy that relied heavily on slave-worked plantations for the production of cotton for export to Europe and to the northern states. If classed equally an independent state, the area of the Confederate States would take ranked as the fourth-richest country of the globe in 1860.[31] The Confederacy had banked on European intervention but information technology proved a fallacy that "Cotton fiber is King". At that place was an opportunity to ship as much cotton as possible to Europe in early 1861 before the Union blockade took effect. However Confederate policy was to ship none at all, so that European material mills would demand their government intervene to help the Confederacy. The Confederates were poorly informed and did not know that European mills already had enough of cotton wool in storage. Britain needed Northern grain more than urgently than Southern cotton, because it was a main element of its food supply.[32]

Vigorous fund raising yielded £3 million (about $14.5 in U.s. dollars) from the 1862 bail sale to the Erlanger bank in Paris. It was not repeated. The money was more often than not wasted on ships that were never delivered (because of the Union blockade) and in futile efforts to prop up the price of Confederate bonds to fool Europeans that the new nation was doing well.[33] The British had coin to invest. They bought some Confederate bonds merely spent far more on the blockade runners equally in Confederate bonds.[34]

When the Marriage began its blockade of Confederate ports in the summer of 1861, exports of cotton fell 95 percent and the South had to restructure itself to emphasize the production of nutrient and munitions for internal use. After losing command of its chief rivers and ports, the Confederacy had to depend for transport on a weak railroad system that, with few repairs beingness made, no new equipment, and subversive raids, crumbled abroad. The financial infrastructure collapsed during the war equally inflation destroyed banks and forced a move toward a barter economy for civilians. The Confederate regime seized needed supplies and livestock (paying with Government bonds that were promised to be paid off after the state of war, but never were). Past 1865, the Confederate economy was in ruins and the 11 states remained poor for another century.[35]

Monetary finance and inflation [edit]

Monthly price index in the Confederacy during the war rose from 100 in January 1861 to over 9200 in Apr 1865. In improver to being fueled by dramatic increases in corporeality of money in apportionment, prices also increased in response to negative news from the battlefield.

The financing of state of war expenditures by the means of currency issues (printing money) was by far the major artery resorted to by the Amalgamated regime. Between 1862 and 1865, more than than 60% of full revenue was created in this way.[36]> While the North doubled its money supply during the state of war, the volume of money in the Southward increased 20 times times over from 1861 to 1865, and prices soared. An particular that cost one Confederate dollar in 1861 cost 92 of these dollars in 1865.[37]

Destruction [edit]

According to William Hesseltine:

Throughout the Due south, fences were downward, weeds had overrun the fields, windows were cleaved, alive stock had disappeared. The assessed valuation of property declined from 30 to 60 per centum in the decade afterward 1860. In Mobile, business was stagnant; Chattanooga and Nashville were ruined; and Atlanta's industrial sections were in ashes.[38]

Guess of Confederate losses were 94,000 killed in battle and another 164,000 who died of disease, with about 194,000 wounded.[39] More accurate recent estimates say another 75,000-100,000 Confederate soldiers died.[xl]

While impairment to Union locales was express to the border region, the Confederacy was massively affected. By the end of the state of war deterioration of the Southern infrastructure was widespread. The number of civilian deaths is unknown. Every Amalgamated state was affected, but about of the war was fought in Virginia and Tennessee, while Texas and Florida saw the least armed services action. Much of the damage was acquired past straight military action, but most was caused by lack of repairs and upkeep, and past deliberately using up resources. Historians accept recently estimated how much of the destruction was caused by military action. Paul Paskoff calculates that Union military operations were conducted in 56% of 645 counties in nine Amalgamated states (excluding Texas and Florida). These counties independent 63% of the 1860 white population and 64% of the slaves. By the time the fighting took identify, undoubtedly some people had fled to safer areas, so the exact population exposed to war is unknown.[41]

Encounter also [edit]

  • History of the Southern United States
  • Confederate railroads in the American Civil War

Notes [edit]

  1. ^ Emerson David Fite, Social and industrial weather in the Northward during the Ceremonious State of war (1910) online edition
  2. ^ Matthew J. Gallman, The N Fights the Civil State of war: The Habitation Front. (Ivan R. Dee, 1994) p 95.
  3. ^ Heather Cox Richardson, The Greatest Nation of the World: Republican Economic Policies during the Civil State of war (1997)
  4. ^ Gavin Wright, Old South, New Due south: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War (1986).
  5. ^ Roger Ransom, Conflict and Compromise: The Political Economy of Slavery, Emancipation and the American Civil War (1989)
  6. ^ Walter Licht, Industrializing America: The Nineteenth Century (1995) pp. 79–101.
  7. ^ Heather Cox Richardson, The greatest nation of the Earth: Republican economic policies during the Civil War (2009) pp ix–x.
  8. ^ Weisman (2002), pp. 27–35.
  9. ^ a b Paludan (1993), pp. 111–112
  10. ^ Paludan (1993), pp. 113–114
  11. ^ Weisman (2002), p. 85.
  12. ^ Weisman (2002), pp. 37–38.
  13. ^ Roger Lowenstein, Means and Means: Lincoln and his cabinet and the financing of the Civil War (2022) pp. 88–106.
  14. ^ a b Paludan (1993), pp. 109–110
  15. ^ Richard Striner, "How to Pay for What We Need: Congress Could Create Money, As It Did During The Civil War, Funding Public Projects That Shock The Economic system Back To Life." The American Scholar 81.1 (2012): 32-41 online].
  16. ^ Paludan (1993), p. 111
  17. ^ Roger Lowenstein, Means and Ways: Lincoln and his chiffonier and the financing of the Ceremonious War (2022) p. 126.
  18. ^ Weisman (2002), pp. 40–42.
  19. ^ Lowenstein, Ways and Ways (2022) p. 127.
  20. ^ a b c d Pollack, Sheldon D. (2014). "The Commencement National Income Tax, 1861–1872" (PDF). Tax Lawyer. 67 (ii).
  21. ^ Lowenstein, Means and Means (2022) p. 126, 128.
  22. ^ Lowenstein, Ways and Means (2022) p. 129.
  23. ^ a b Weisman (2002), pp. 81–82.
  24. ^ Weisman (2002), pp. 84–88.
  25. ^ Weisman (2002), pp.ninety-91, 99–101.
  26. ^ Richardson, Greatest Nation, pp 31-66.
  27. ^ Faulkner p. 344 .
  28. ^ Melinda Lawson, "Jay Cooke and the War Bail Drives." in Major Problems in the Ceremonious War and Reconstruction: Documents and Essays (2010): 231+.
  29. ^ Frederick J. Bluish, Salmon P. Hunt (1987) pp 148–149.
  30. ^ Jay Sexton, Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and American Foreign Relations in the Ceremonious War Era, 1837-1873 (2005) pp 81–133.
  31. ^ Fred Bateman and Thomas J. Weiss, "A Deplorable Scarcity: The Failure of Industrialization in the Slave Economic system U of North Carolina Press, 2017 pp 4, 42.
  32. ^ Eli Ginzberg, "The economic science of British neutrality during the American Civil War." Agricultural History 10.4 (1936): 147-156.
  33. ^ Harold U. Faulkner American Economic History (8th ed. 1959), p. 344
  34. ^ Judith Fenner Gentry, "A Amalgamated Success in Europe: The Erlanger Loan." Journal of Southern History 36#2 (1970), pp. 157–88, online.
  35. ^ Paul F. Paskoff, "Measures of War: A Quantitative Examination of the Civil War'due south Destructiveness in the Confederacy", Civil War History (2008) 54#1 pp 35–62.
  36. ^ John Munro Godfrey, "Monetary expansion in the Confederacy", (Dissertations in American economic history, Ayer Publishing, 1978) p 14.
  37. ^ Timothy D. Tregarthen and Libby Rittenberg, Principles of Macroeconomics (Macmillan, 2009) figure 11.10.
  38. ^ Hesseltine, William B. (1936). A History of the South, 1607–1936. New York: Prentice-Hall. pp. 573–574.
  39. ^ For details run into Livermore, Thomas L. (1901). Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America 1861–65. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin.
  40. ^ Hacker, J. David (2011). "A Census-Based Count of the Civil State of war Expressionless". Civil War History. 57 (iv): 307–348. doi:10.1353/cwh.2011.0061. PMID 22512048.
  41. ^ Paskoff, Paul F. (2008). "Measures of War: A Quantitative Examination of the Civil War's Destructiveness in the Confederacy". Civil War History. 54 (1): 35–62. doi:10.1353/cwh.2008.0007.

Further reading [edit]

  • Andreano, Ralph, ed. The Economical Bear on of the American Civil War (1962) online
  • Barreyre, Nicolas. Gold and freedom: The political economy of reconstruction (U of Virginia Press, 2015).
  • Clark, Jr., John E. Railroads in the Ceremonious War: The Impact of Management on Victory and Defeat (2004)
  • Cochran, Thomas C. "Did the Civil War retard industrialization?." Mississippi Valley Historical Review 48.two (1961): 197–210. online
  • Gates, Paul Due west. Agriculture and the Civil War (1965) online
  • Gilchrist, David T. and West. David Lewis, eds. Economic Change in the Civil War Era: Proceedings of a Conference on American Economical Institutional Change, 1850-1873 (1965) 180pp. online review
  • Goldin, Claudia D., and Frank D. Lewis. "The economical cost of the American Civil War: Estimates and implications." Journal of Economic History 35.2 (1975): 299–326. online
  • Heidler, David Due south., et al. Encyclopedia of the American Civil State of war: A Political, Social, and Military machine History, (2002). 2740 pages
  • Resch, John P. et al. eds. Americans at State of war: Lodge, Civilization and the Homefront vol ii: 1816-1900 (2005)

Union [edit]

  • Anderson, J.L. "The Vacant Chair on the Subcontract: Soldier Husbands, Subcontract Wives, and the Iowa Domicile Front, 1861–1865," Annals of Iowa (2007) 66#3 pp 241–265
  • Bordewich, Fergus M. Congress at War: How Republican Reformers Fought the Civil State of war, Defied Lincoln, Ended Slavery, and Remade America (2020) excerpt
  • Donald, David Herbert. Lincoln (1995), major scholarly biography
  • Gallman, Matthew J. The North Fights the Civil War: The Dwelling house Front (Ivan R. Dee, 1994) online.
  • McPherson, James Grand. Boxing Cry of Freedom: The Ceremonious War Era (1988); a major scholarly survey. online
  • Paludan, Phillip Shaw. The Presidency of Abraham Lincoln (1994).

Marriage economic system [edit]

  • Bluish, Frederick J. Salmon P. Chase (1987), the Secretarial assistant of the Treasury
  • Fite, Emerson David. Social and industrial atmospheric condition in the Due north during the Civil State of war (1910) online edition, one-time but withal useful
  • Hammond, Bray. Sovereignty and the Empty Purse: Banks and Politics in the Civil State of war (1970) online.
  • Hammond, Bray. "The North's Empty Purse, 1861–1862," American Historical Review, (1961) 67#i, pp. 1–18 in JSTOR
  • Hyman, Hyman. American Singularity: The 1787 Northwest Ordinance, the 1862 Homestead and Morrill Acts, and the 1944 GI Bill (U of Georgia Printing, 2008) online
  • Lowenstein, Roger. Means and Means: Lincoln and His Cabinet and the Financing of the Civil State of war (2022); major scholarly survey; online review
  • Marshall, Joan East. "Aid for Union Soldiers' Families: A Comfortable Entitlement or a Pauper's Pittance? Indiana, 1861–1865." Social Service Review 78.2 (2004): 207–242.
  • Merk, Frederick. Economical history of Wisconsin during the Civil War decade (1916) online
  • Mitchell, Wesley C. A history of the greenbacks: with special reference to the economic consequences of their issue: 1862–65 (1903) online
  • Myers, Margaret 1000. Fiscal History of the United States (1970) pp 148–97 online
  • Oberholtzer, Ellis Paxson. Jay Cooke: Financier of the Civil War (1907) online.
  • Richardson, Heather Cox. The Greatest Nation of the Earth: Republican Economic Policies during the Civil State of war (1997) excerpt
  • Sexton, Jay. Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and American Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era, 1837-1873 (Clarendon Press, 2005) pp 81–133.
  • Studenski, Paul, and Herman Due east. Kroos. Fiscal History of the Usa: Financial, budgetary, banking, and tariff, including financial administration and country and local finances (1963) pp 137–160.
  • Thomson, David K. "" Similar a Cord through the Whole Country" Union Bonds and Financial Mobilization for Victory." Journal of the Civil War era 6.3 (2016): 347-375 online.
  • Weber, Thomas. The northern railroads in the Civil State of war, 1861–1865 (1999)
  • Weiman, David F., and John A. James. "The Political Economy of the Usa Monetary Union: The Civil War Era as a Watershed." American Economic Review 97#2 (2007), pp. 271–75, online.
  • Weisman, Steven R. The Great Tax Wars: Lincoln to Wilson-The Tearing Battles over Money That Transformed the Nation (2002) online.
  • Wilson, Mark R. "The Business concern of Civil War: Military Enterprise, the State, and Political Economy in the United States, 1850—1880." Enterprise & Society four#five (2003), pp. 599–605, online.
  • Wilson, Mark R. The concern of Civil War: Military mobilization and the country, 1861–1865 (JHU Press, 2006).
  • Ziparo, Jessica. This grand experiment: When women entered the federal workforce in Ceremonious War–Era Washington, DC (UNC Printing Books, 2017).
  • Zonderman, David A. "White Workers and the American Civil War." Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History (2021).

Confederacy [edit]

  • Current, Richard North., et al. eds. Encyclopedia of the Confederacy (1993) (4 Volume prepare; [https://annal.org/details/confederacyselec00newy i vol abridged version online)
  • Coulter, E. Merton. The Confederate States of America, 1861–1865. (LSU Printing 1950).
  • Davis, William C. and Robertson, James I., Jr., eds. Virginia at State of war, 1861. (UP of Kentucky, 2005).
  • Davis, William C. Look Away! A History of the Confederate States of America. (2003) online.
  • Doyle, Brooke Graham. "Hyperinflation and the Confederacy: An Interdisciplinary Lesson in Economics and History Hyperinflation and the Confederacy: An Interdisciplinary Lesson in Economics and History." Social Education (2001) online.
  • Eaton, Clement. A History of the Southern Confederacy (1954) online.
  • Gentry, Judith Fenner. "A Confederate Success in Europe: The Erlanger Loan." Journal of Southern History 36#ii (1970), pp. 157–88, online.
  • Lowenstein, Roger. Means and Means: Lincoln and his cabinet and the financing of the Civil War (2022).
  • Massey, Mary Elizabeth. Ersatz in the Confederacy: Shortages and Substitutions on the Southern Homefront. (reprint U of South Carolina Press, 1994).
  • Morgan, Chad. Planters' Progress: Modernizing Amalgamated Georgia. (Up of Florida, 2005).
  • Palen, Marc-William. "The Civil War's Forgotten Transatlantic Tariff Debate and the Confederacy's Gratis Trade Diplomacy." Periodical of the Civil State of war Era iii#1 (2013), pp. 35–61, online.
  • Paskoff, Paul F. "Measures of State of war: A Quantitative Exam of the Civil War's Destructiveness in the Confederacy", Civil War History (2008) 54#1 pp 35–62. online
  • Schwab, John Christopher. The Amalgamated States of America, 1861-1865: A Fiscal and Industrial History of the South (1901) good survey of finances by a Yale economic science professor; online
  • Sexton, Jay. Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and American Foreign Relations in the Ceremonious War Era, 1837-1873 (Clarendon Press, 2005) pp 134–189.
  • Thomas, Emory M. Confederate Nation: 1861-1865, 1979. Standard political-economic-social history online
  • Thomas, Emory Thousand. The Confederacy as a Revolutionary Experience (1992) online.

Historiography [edit]

  • Adams, Sean Patrick. "Wartime Political Economy." in A Companion to the US Civil War (2014): 1073–1086.
  • Craig, Lee. "Industry, Agronomics, and the Economy" in The American Ceremonious War: A handbook of literature and research ed. by Steven E. Woodworth, and Robert Higham. (Greenwood, 1996) pp 505–514.

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_history_of_the_United_States_Civil_War

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